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Abstract
Over the past few years, many  studies  have looked at the  level  of corruption  in the sector.  On the side of bribe
macroeconomic,  cultural,  and institutional  determinants  payers, enterprises  that are more profitable,  enterprises
of corruption.  This study complements these  cross-  that have greater overdue  payment to  utilities,  and de
country studies  by focusing  on microeconomic  factors  nova private  firms pay higher bribes. On the side of bribe
that affect bribes paid in a  single sector of the economy.  takers, bribes paid to utilities are  higher in countries with
Using enterprise-level  data on  bribes paid to utilities  in  greater constraints  on utility capacity,  lower levels  of
21  transition  economies  in Easter Europe and Central  competition  in the utility sector,  and where utilities  are
Asia,  Clarke and Xu look at how characteristics  of the  state-owned.  Bribes  in  the utility  sector are  also
firms paying bribes (such  as ownership, profitability,  and  correlated with  many  of the macroeconomic  and political
size)  and characteristics  of the utilities taking bribes (such  factors that previous  studies have  found  to affect the
as  competition and utility capacity) affect the equilibrium  overall level  of corruption.
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Since  the pioneering  papers  on  corruption  and rent seeking  in the  sixties  and  seventies
(Becker,  1968;  Becker  and  Stigler,  1974;  Krueger,  1974;  Leff,  1964;  Rose-Ackerman,  1978),
many  studies  have  looked  at the  determinants  and  consequences  of corruption.'  While  some
authors  have  seen  bribes  either  as  "grease  money"  that lubricates  the  squeaky  wheels of rigid
bureaucracy  and  commerce  (Leff,  1964;  Huntington,  1968)  or  as  an  endogenously  generated
price  mechanism that corrects  disequilibria  and restores  optimal  allocation  in the market (Lui,
1985),  most  have  viewed  corruption  less  positively,  suggesting  that  it  distorts  economic
decisions.  For example, it has been suggested that corruption  might result in the misallocation  of
talent  to  occupations  with  large  opportunities  for  rent  seeking  (Baumol,  1990;  Murphy  et al.,
1991),  might bias bureaucrats  towards purchases  on which it is easier to collect bribes  (Shleifer
and  Vishny,  1993),  or  might  affect  income  distribution  adversely  (Rose-Ackerman,  1978).
Consistent  with the  less  flattering  view  of corruption,  recent  empirical  studies  have found  that
corruption  hampers  growth,  reduces  income,  and  increases  inequality  (Mauro  1995;  Myrdal
1968;  Li et al., 2000;  Bardhan  1997),2  while other studies have found that it reduces investment
(Mauro,  1995),  increases  the size  of the unofficial  economy  (Friedman  et al., 2000;  Murphy  et
al., 1993), and is associated with lower levels of human capital, urbanization,  financial depth and
foreign trade (Li et al., 2000).3
In addition  to the  literature  on  the  effect  of corruption  on  economic  outcomes,  a  large
supplementary  literature  has  appeared  on the  determinants  of corruption.  These  studies  have
found that  corruption  is lower  in countries  that are  more  open to foreign  trade;  countries  with
protestant traditions  and  that were  formerly  British colonies;  countries  with longer exposure  to
democracy;  countries  that  are  more  democratic;  countries  with  greater  political  stability  and
ISee Bardhan (1997)  for an excellent review of issues.  Also  see Rose-Ackerman  (1978).
2 The inequality-raising  effects are not observed for high levels of corruption because the income  levels are likely to
be low for most people, resulting in low levels of income inequality  (Li et al., 2000).
3Other studies of corruption  include  Alam (1990),  Ades and  Di Tella  (1997),  Bliss and Di Tella  (1997),  De Long
and Shleifer (1993), Fisman (2001), Johnson et al. (1988),  Johnson et al. (1997)  Li (1999), and Mookherjee  and Png
(1995).greater freedom of the press; and countries  with parliamentary systems (see, for example,  Ades
and  Di Tella,  1999;  Treisman,  2000;  Lederman  et al., 2001;  and Wei,  2000).4  Most of these
earlier  studies  have used  cross-country  subjective  indices  (e.g.,  from the  International  Country
Risk Guide)  and have  focused on how  macroeconomic,  cultural and  institutional  factors  affect
the overall level of corruption.
Although  this  paper  fits  squarely  into  the  existing  literature  on  the  determinants  of
corruption,  it complements  it in several ways.  First, rather than using subjective  survey data on
the level of corruption,  this paper uses data on the actual bribes that enterprise  managers  report
paying (as  percent of revenues)  - a  measure  that  does not  suffer  from some  of the  problems
associated  with  subjective  measures.5 More  importantly,  rather  than  focusing  on the  overall
level  of corruption  in a  country,  the  paper  looks  at firm-level  data  on  bribes  paid  to a  single
sector  of  the  economy  - infrastructure.  This  allows  us  to  focus  on characteristics  of the
enterprises  that  pay  and  receive  bribes  in  addition  to  characteristics  of the  institutional  and
macroeconomic  environment.  For enterprises paying bribes,  we look at whether willingness-to-
pay  and  ownership  of the  enterprise  offering  the  bribe  and  the  nature  of the  enterprises'
relationship with the utility affects the equilibrium level of the bribe payment.  On the other side
of the  equation,  we  look  at  whether  the  equilibrium  bribe  payment  is  affected  by  capacity,
competition  and  privatization  in  infrastructure  - factors  that might  affect  either  the  internal
incentives of the utility companies  or their ability to demand bribes.
The empirical  results are  largely consistent  with the conceptual  framework  presented  in
the next  section of the paper.  We find that  the bribe payments  are  lower  in countries  where
infrastructure  is better developed,  suggesting that excess demand is an  important determinant  of
corruption.  The  extent  of competition  in  the  telecommunications  sector,  measured  by  the
number of  cellular  operators  in  the  country,  also  appears  to  reduce  the  equilibrium  level  of
4 However,  some  results vary between studies.  For example,  Lederman et al. (2001)  find that corruption  is lower in
democracies,  while Treisman (2000)  finds no  evidence of this.  In addition,  whereas  Fisman and Gatti  (2001)  find
that  corruption  is  lower  in countries  with  greater  decentralization,  Treisman  (2000)  finds  corruption  is  higher  in
federal  states.  Finally,  Knack and Azfar (2000)  find that the association  between  corruption and trade  intensity  is
not robust when they use measures of corruption  that are available  for larger samples of countries.  They argue that
this is because larger  samples are less subject to selection bias.
2bribes.  After  controlling  for  capacity  and  competition,  we  also  find  that bribes  are  lower  in
countries  where  the  utility companies  have been  privatized.  One potential  explanation  for this
final result is that private owners might have a greater incentive  than public managers to impose
stiff penalties upon employees taking bribes, reducing bribe payments.
Characteristics  of the  enterprise  offering  the  bribe  also affect  payments.  For example,
enterprises  that are more profitable  appear to pay higher bribes  - a result that is consistent  with
both  the  queuing  (Lui,  1985)  and  the  endogenous  harassment  (Myrdal,  1968)  theories  of
corruption.  Also  consistent  with the endogenous  harassment theory,  firms with higher overdue
payments to utilities  appear to pay higher bribes, perhaps because they have a weaker bargaining
position  vis-a-vis  the  employees  of the  utility  company.  The  duration  of the  relationship
between the enterprises paying and receiving the bribe and ownership also appears to matter:  de
novo private firms are  found to pay higher bribes  than established  firms.  Finally, we find strong
support for the complementarity  of the overall level of corruption  in a country and bribes in the
utility sector.
II.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Consider  a  company  that  provides  utility  services  (i.e.,  power  or telecommunications
services)  and many firms that demand the service.  If there is excess  demand for the service that
the utility provides - for example  if there are price ceiling  or if limits on public investment have
historically  limited  system  expansion  - there  will  be  rents  associated  with  access  to  utility
6 services.  In this situation, if employees of the utility company  have some discretion  over which
enterprises or individuals  get connected to the service or have broken down connections  repaired,
utility  employees  will  be  able  to  demand  additional  payments  from the  firms  and  individuals
5 See Bertrand and Mullainathan  (2001)  for a general  discussion about problems related to subjective survey data.
6  In practice, utility  services  in many developing  and transition  economies  have been  severely  rationed,  with long
waiting lists  for connections.  The average  waiting list over the  number  of main  lines  (or the  waiting list  ratio)  is
0.17  for  the  17  countries  in  our  sample  that  have  non-missing  values  for  waiting  list  ratio  in  1998  (authors'
calculation based on the ITU data).  In addition,  see footnote  9.
3demanding service or repairs in return for reducing wait periods.7 Enterprises will be less willing
to pay bribes when the excess demand for utility service is lower - i.e., lower excess demand will
force down the shadow price of utility service and, thus, lower the enterprises'  willingness to pay
bribes.8 Since,  other  things  being  equal  (including  income  level),  we  would  expect  excess
demand for service to be highest in those  countries with the largest capacity constraints, we thus
expect:9
Hypothesis 1. Bribes paid to utilities will be lower in countries where the utility's
capacity is greater.
Privatization of the utility company is often associated with an increase in investment and
a large  expansion of capacity.'0 Hypothesis  1 then suggests that utility privatization will reduce
bribe payments  by removing  capacity restrictions.  However,  privatization might  affect  bribes
even  after  controlling  for the  impact  of privatization  on capacity.  Here  the penalty  function
imposed  by  management  on  utility  employees  who  take  bribes  will  play  an  important  role.
When  a company  is privatized,  the private owners  become residual  claimants  on the income  of
the  company,  giving  them  a  large  incentive  to  reduce  corruption.  In  contrast,  under  public
ownership,  it is often not clear who the residual  claimants are  and who will gain  from reducing
corruption  (e.g.,  whether  the funds would  go the  Treasury,  to political  leaders,  or to the utility
itself).  Further,  although  profits  are  the  property  of the  general  public  in  theory,  individual
members  of the public  have  little  incentive  to  monitor  the employees  of the  utility  company.
Since privatization will raise the marginal benefit of monitoring  employees without affecting the
marginal cost, privatization  will increase  the optimal  amount of monitoring,  and thus reduce  the
extent of bribes.
7Of course, the utility employees will have to balance the gains from the bribe with the possible loss of income  due
to the penalty they will face if caught.
8 This is similar to the point made by Ades and De Tella (1999).
9 Although the waiting period might be seem to be a more appropriate measure  of excess  demand,  waiting period is
often poorly measured and can be endogenous  if long waits deter people from bothering  to request service.
10  See,  for  example,  recent  studies  of the  effect  of privatization  on  the  telecommunications  sector  (Ros,  1999;
Wallsten 2001; Li and Xu 2001).
4Other aspects of public ownership might also increase corruption under public ownership.
In general, principal-agent problems  between  owners  and managers  might be worse  for publicly
owned  enterprises.'"  In particular,  it is often difficult  to tie managers'  salaries  to profits under
civil service  pay schemes  or to  reward  public  managers  with stock or stock options.'2 Even if
contractual  arrangements  linking  the managers'  wages to profitability  are politically feasible,  in
the  weak  institutional  environments  found  in  many  developing  and  transition  economies,  it
would  be  difficult  to  find  credible  third  parties  that  could  force  the  government  to  honor  it
contractual  obligations  (Shirley  and  Xu,  1998).  Under  these  circumstances,  and  especially  if
side-payments  from  corrupt  employees  are  possible,  managers  might  not  be  willing  to  exert
much  effort  to  reduce  corruption.  Finally,  in  countries  where  inflation  or  pay  freezes  have
eroded  salaries  in the  civil  service  and  public  utility,  threats  to  fire  corrupt  employees  will
generally  be less  effective.  These factors,  combined  with greater monitoring  by private  owners
(relative  to public owners),  will mean  that privatization  should  reduce  both stealing  and bribes
even if privatization fails to reduce  excess demand.  We thus have hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2.  Bribes will be lower when the utility company is privately owned.
Competition  faced by the  utility company might also reduce  corruption.  First, increased
competition might increase  the total supply of infrastructure  services  (relative  to supply under a
monopoly),  because  monopolists  take  into  account  the  effect  that raising  output has  on prices
when setting  output levels.  According  to hypothesis  1, this quantity  effect  should reduce  bribe
payments.  Moreover,  when  there  are  multiple  utility  service  providers,  utility customers  can
respond to demands  for bribes  by switching to other providers.  Anticipating this, the producer
might be less likely to ask for bribes or to ask  for lower bribe payments (Rose-Ackerman  1978;
Shleifer  and Vishny  1993;  Ades and Di  Tella  1999).  The  effect  of competition  on bribes  will
depend  crucially  upon  whether  the  users'  threats  to  change  utility  company  are  credible.
I  For  example,  Shirley  and Xu (1998)  note  that managers  of public  enterprises  answer  to  many principals,  who
impose differing,  and sometimes conflicting, objectives  and constraints upon them.
12 Laffont and Tirole (1991)  note that because managers of public enterprises do not own stock or stock options  and
are  not  subject  to  corporate  takeovers  that  could  cost them  their jobs,  they  typically  have  less  reason to  adopt  a
sufficiently long-term  perspective  focusing on  productive  efficiency.  Similarly,  this  will  make it  more difficult  to
encourage  managers to reduce corruption  among employees  even when it affects profitability.
5Because  of this,  in  the  telecommunications  sector,  the  number  of cellular  operators  should
provide  a better  measure  of competition  that the number  of fixed-line  operators.  Even when
there  are  multiple  fixed-line  operators,  local  monopoly  provision  of services  is  likely  - in
contrast,  cellular  operators will often compete locally with fixed line  operators.  We thus expect
bribes  to  be  lower  in  countries  with  greater  competition,  as  measured  by  competition  from
cellular operators.
Hypothesis 3.  Bribes to utilities will be lower in countries with greater competition in
infrastructure.
So  far  we  have  focused  on  the  bribe  taker,  the  utility  companies.  However,
characteristics  of the  bribe  payer,  the  firm  demanding  utility  service,  might  also  affect  bribe
payments.  The  simplest theory about the determinants  of bribing behavior of utility customers
(firms  in this paper) is  the "speed  money" or the efficiency  theory of bribes  (Barzel,  1974;  Lui
1985; Leff 1964; Huntington  1968).  Assuming there is no stigma associated with bribery - or at
least that the stigma associated with paying bribes  does not depend on enterprise  profitability  -
firms that benefit more from utility service will generally offer larger bribe payments for reduced
wait periods  for connection  or repairs.  Consequently,  we would observe  allocation of the utility
services  according  to  the value  that  different  enterprises  place  on  utility  service.  Under  this
hypothesis,  utility  services  will  be allocated  efficiently with the bribe  acting  as  a perfect  price
discrimination  mechanism.  Although  the  benefit  that  an  individual  firm  gains  from  utility
services  is  unobservable,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  firms  that  are  more  profitable  will
generally benefit more the utility services.  This can be justified,  for example,  by the plausible
assumption  of complementarity  of managerial  ability  or monopoly  rents  with  utility  service.
With this assumption, the "speed money" theory of bribery implies
Hypothesis 4.  Enterprises that are more profitable will pay higher bribes than  less
profitable enterprises.
Hypothesis 4 can also be explained  by the endogenous  harassment theory,  as suggested  in
Myrdal  (1968)  and  further  elaborated  in  Kaufmann  and  Wei  (1999).  The  provider  can  use
observable  information such as industry,  size,  or profitability to guess each enterprise's  maximum
willingness-to-pay  for utility service  and endogenously offer incentive compatible  bribe levels that
6depend  on  such  characteristics.  In  this  case,  the  relationship  between  bribe  payments  and
profitability will also be positive.  Although the basic ingredient in both the 'speed money'  and the
endogenous  harassment  theories  is  that  the  bribe  amount  of different  firms  increase  with  the
willingness-to-pay  for service, the utility employees demanding the bribe need more information  in
the  'endogenous  harassment'  theory.  In the  "speed  money" hypothesis  the enterprise  paying  the
bribe  self-selects  the amount  of the  bribe  according  to  its cost of waiting,  while  the  endogenous
harassment  version  requires  that  the  utility  employees  taking  the  bribe  discriminate  between
enterprises  and,  thus,  require  that  the  utility  has  information  on  profitability  and  other  firm
characteristics  that affect the enterprises'  willingness-to-pay.  In practice, the data used in this paper
do not allow us to easily distinguish between these two theories.
Related to the  endogenous  harassment theory,  another  factor that might affect enterprises'
willingness-to-bribe  is size of the enterprises'  overdue payments to the utility company - something
that  is  a significant  problem in many countries  in Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia.'3  When  an
enterprise had high debts to the utility company, the utility employee  can more credibly threaten to
cut  the  enterprises'  utility  connection  - the  enterprise  manager  would  find  it more  difficult  to
complain  to  either  the judiciary or to  the  employee's  superiors  within  the utility  company  about
being  disconnected  if he  has  overdue  payments.  In  bilateral  bargaining  between  the  utility
employee and the firm, the fallback position of the firm is worse and, hence,  its bargaining power is
weaker.  Consequently,  the utility  employee will  be  able to extract  higher  bribes from  firms  that
have overdue payments to the utility.  In contrast, overdue payments to workers or suppliers  should
not have this effect - although the utility employee would be able to threaten to cut off service to a
non-paying customer, it would not be able to do the same to a customer that pays its utility bills in a
timely way but has overdue payments to suppliers or employees.  Further, to the extent that overdue
payments  suggest  that  the  enterprise  is  distressed  or has cash  flow  problems,  we might  expect
enterprises  with  other types  of overdue  payments  to  be  less willing  (or able)  to pay  cash bribes.
Since  several  authors  have  argued  that  overdue  payments  to  workers  are  a  better  measure  of
financial  distress  than overdue  payments  to  suppliers,  we might expect  enterprises  with  overdue
13  In  the  World  Business  Environment  Survey  (WBES)  for  the  transition  economies,  33  percent  of enterprises
reported  having  overdue  payments  to  utilities.  For  a general  discussion  of non-payment  in the  power sector  in
Eastern  Europe and Central Asia, see World Bank (1999).
7payments  to workers to pay lower bribes than enterprises  without overdue  payments to workers.14
We thus arrive at hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 5.  Enterprises with higher overdue payments to the utility company will pay
higher bribes than other enterprises. In contrast, enterprises  with overdue payment to workers and
suppliers  will pay similar  or lower bribes to utilities.
The  relationship  between  the  enterprise  paying  the bribe  and  the  utility  receiving  the
bribe might also influence  the  size of the bribe.  For example, de novo private  enterprise  might
pay higher bribes than other enterprises  for several  reasons.  First, if de novo private firms  were
more  profitable  than other enterprises,  we  would  expect them to pay higher bribes.15 Second,
bribe taking might be more risky for the utility employees in the early stages of the relationship.
For instance,  before the utility employee has developed a relationship  with the bribe payer,  there
is higher likelihood  that the  enterprise  paying  the  bribe would  inform others  about the  corrupt
deal or that the deal is part of a  'sting'  operation by either law  enforcement  or the employee's
managers.  Since this  increases the risk that the utility employee will  be detected and punished,
the employee might demand higher payments,  as a form of risk premium,  to let the deal proceed.
As the relationship  becomes consolidated  with years  of collusion,  the bond is no  longer needed
and a stream of variable payment is sufficient.'6 Consequently,  we might expect de novo private
firms  to  pay  higher  bribes  than  other  types  of firms,  which  will  have  already  developed
relationships with employees  of the utility company.
Hypothesis 6. De novo privatefirms  pay higher bribes than establishedfirms.
14  Schaffer  (1998)  argues  that  since suppliers  can always  stop  shipping  to  non-paying  customers,  inter-enterprise
arrears  do  not  necessarily  signal  financial  distress.  In contrast,  given  the  high rates  of unemployment  in many
transition economies - and regional  economies heavily dependent on single enterprises - the same might not be true
for workers.
15  Megginson  and  Netter (2001)  and  Shirley and  Walsh  (2000)  discuss  reasons  why privately  owned  enterprises
might perform better than  state-owned enterprises  and present  evidence  that supports  these  hypotheses.  Since  the
start  of the  transition  over  ten  years  ago,  many  studies  have  compared  the  relative  performance  of state-  and
privately owned enterprises in Eastern Europe and  Central Asia.  A recent meta-analysis  of these studies found that
privately owned enterprises appear to generally perform better than state-owned enterprises  in these economies  (see,
Djankov and Murrell, 2000).
16 Maybe  it is  in this sense that "It used to be said of General  Noriega of Panama  in his heyday that he could not be
bought, he could only be rented" (quoted by Bardhan 1997, p. 1324).
8In addition  to characteristics  of the utility taking the bribe and  the enterprise  paying the
bribe,  the  enviromnent  in  which  the  enterprise  and  utility  operate  might  also  affect  bribe
payments,  especially in light of the multiple-equilibria  nature of corruption.  The incentives  of an
individual to be corrupt depend on how many other people  are corrupt (Andvig  1991).  When the
society  is  already  corrupt,  the  moral costs  of corruption  are  low,  making the strategy  of being
corrupt  a Nash  equilibrium.  Moreover,  given limited  enforcement  resources,  the possibility of
being detected might also be lower in more corrupt societies.  We thus expect bribes in the utility
sector to  be  higher  in countries  where  other forms of corruption are  more  common.  In  other
words,  factors  that raise  the general  level  of corruption  in  a country  might also  increase  bribe
taking  in the  utility  sector  even  if they  have  little  direct  effect  on the  incentives  of either  the
enterprise paying the bribe or the utility receiving  the bnibe.
As previously discussed, there  is a large literature that discusses factors  that might affect
the  overall level  of corruption  in  a given  country.  First,  several  authors  have  argued that the
rents might be lower in more competitive  economies and, therefore,  that corruption might also be
lower in these  countries  (Rose-Ackerman  1978;  Shleifer  and  Vishny  1993;  Ades  and De  Tella
1999).  Consistent  with  this,  Ades  and  De  Tella  (1999)  find  that  corruption  is  higher  when
domestic  firns  are  sheltered  from  foreign  competition  by natural  or policy  induced barrier  to
trade.'7 To control  for this,  our base  regression  includes measures of the extent of competition
and the existence  of rents similar to those used in previous studies - the ratio of imports to GDP
(to  measure  competition)  and  the  ratio of mineral,  fuel  and  metal  exports  to total  exports  (to
measure  rents).  Second, corruption tends to be lower in countries with political  institutions  that
highlight political  accountability  and give voice to voters.  For instance,  past studies have found
that corruption  is lower  in countries  with longer exposure  to democracy (Treisman,  2000)  or in
countries that are more democratic (Lederman  et al., 2001).  Third, corruption  should be lower in
countries that are growing more rapidly.  For example, Baumol (1990)  and Murphy et al. (1991)
suggest  that occupational  choice  is  affected by the way in which talents  are rewarded.  When
growth  is  faster, talent will  tend to flow to productive  sector  instead of the rent-seeking  sector
and, therefore, we might expect corruption to be lower in countries that are growing faster.
17 Knack and Azfar (2000)  find that this result, however, is not highly robust.  See footnote 4.
9Hypothesis 7.  Given the complementarity of corruption  in the society with corruption in
the utility industry, we expect utility bribes to be lower in countries with lower level of rents (as
measured by  a higher level of imports,  and lower export shares of fuel,  mineral, and metal
export), in countries that are more democratic or have longer exposures to democracy; and in
countries that are growing more rapidly.
III.  EMPiRICAL  IMPLEMENTATION
111.1  Data
The  main source  of data used in this  paper is the  World Business  Environment  Survey
(WBES), a cross-sectional  survey of industrial and service enterprises conducted  in mid-1999 by
the  World Bank  and  several  other  agencies.'8 The main purpose  of the  WBES is to  identify
perceived  constraints  on  enterprise  performance  and  growth  in  developing  and  transition
economies.  The survey, therefore,  has a large number of questions on how taxation, regulation,
the  performance  of the  financial  sector,  the  institutional  environment  and  corruption  affect
business  operations.  In  contrast,  the  survey  includes  little  information  on  enterprise
characteristics  or performance.  In particular,  although some information  on assets,  sales, broad
sector  of  operations,  ownership,  employees,  and  enterprise  growth  was  collected,  detailed
balance  sheet  information  and profit  and loss  statements  were not collected  from  participating
enterprises.
Although the WBES  was  conducted  in many countries  throughout  the world, and  some
effort  was  made  to  ensure  cross-country  comparability,  the  degree  of  detail  varies  greatly
between  regions.  For example,  although  data was  collected  on actual  sales,  fixed assets,  and
debts  in some  regions,  only  categorical  data  on the  same  information  was  collected  in  other
regions.  For  the  purpose  of this  study,  the  most  important  difference  between  the  surveys
completed  in various regions  is that questions that allow  us to calculate  bribes paid  to utilities
18  The  survey  of  the  transition  economies  was  conducted  in  collaboration  with  the  European  Bank  for
Reconstruction  and Development.  Hellman  et al. (2000) and European Bank for Reconstruction  and Development
(1999) provide more complete descriptions of the survey.
10were  asked only  in the  transition  economies  of Eastern Europe  and Central  Asia.  The  sample
includes about 3000 enterprises from 21  transition economies.19
The  enterprise  level  data  from the  WBES  is  supplemented  with  data  from  a  variety  of
other sources.  In addition to  characteristics  of the enterprise  paying the  bribe,  the analysis  also
includes  characteristics  of the  utilities,  the  enterprises  receiving  the  bribe  payments.  In  the
electricity  sector,  we focus  on the  distribution utilities,  since  these  are  the enterprises  that will
generally  interface  with the  (mostly small)  enterprises  in the WBES  sample.  However,  for the
most  part,  we  focus  on  the  telecommunications  sector  because  there  are  readily  available
measures of competition  and privatization  in the telecommunications  sector.  By the late  1990s,
cellular services provided significant  competition for fixed line services in many developing  and
transition  economies.  By  1999,  most  of the countries  included  in this analysis  had  significant
penetration  by cellular  services  (see Figure  1) and in some  countries there were nearly as many
cellular  subscribers  as fixed main  lines.  Further,  since the  WBES does not provide  information
on  the  enterprises'  locations  within  the  country,  and  because  electricity  distribution  is  often
handled  on  a  local  or  regional  basis,  it  is  generally  easier  to  observe  privatization  in  the
telecommunications  sector than it is in the power sector.20 The  information on the privatization
of  telecommunications  operators  was  provided  by  the  World  Bank  Telecommunications
Department  and  information  on  the privatization  of electricity  distribution  was  obtained  from
Bacon  (1999).  Information  on  number  of  fixed  lines  come  from  International
Telecommunications  Union  (2000),  while  the number of cellular  companies  operating  in  each
country was calculated using information from EMC (2001) and Telecoms and Wireless Reports:
Eastern Europe/Commonwealth of  Independent State by Pyramid Research.
19  The  countries  in  the  sample  for  transition  economies  are:  Albania,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Bulgaria,
Croatia,  the  Czech Republic,  Estonia,  Georgia,  Hungary,  Kazakhstan,  the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Lithuania,  Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russia,  Slovenia, the  Slovak Republic, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
20 Bacon  (1999)  provides information  on whether any privatization of electricity distribution had occurred  by  1999,
but did not provide information on the extent of privatization.100%
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Figure 1:  Cellular subscribers per main fixed line.
Data Source:  Intemational Telecommunications Union (2001).
The  macroeconomic  and political  data used to  control  for  factors  that might  affect  the
overall  level  of corruption  in the countries  in the  sample  are  taken  from  a variety  of sources
including World Bank  (2001), Beck et al. (2001),  and  Freedom  House  (2000).  Table  1 and
Table 2 provide  sources, brief descriptions and summary statistics for the main variables used in
this analysis.
12111.2  Empirical Specification
The  dependent  variable  used
100%  in  this  study  is  the  percent  of
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Figure 2:  Upper Bounds of Bribe Payments  to Utilities  (as %  telecommunications  companies)  and
of Revenues)  in the Sample Countries.  the share of those unofficial  payments
Note:  The categories  are cumulative.  Because each enterprise has unique
upper and lower bounds,  enterprises are classified by upper bounds.  For  that  were  spent  'to  get  connected  to
example,  an enterprise that reported paying between 0.1% of revenues  and
1.9%  of revenues in bribes  to utilities would be counted only in the 'less than  and  maintain  public  services
2.0%' and  'less than 5.0%'  percent categories (even  if its actual payments -
which are not observed - were only 0.2% of revenues).  (electricity  and  telephone)'.  The
enterprise  manager's  response  to  the  first  question  about  total  unofficial  payments  was
categorical  (i.e.,  0%  of revenues;  less  than  1%;  between  1 and  1.99%;  between  2  and 9.99%;
between  10 and 12%; between  13 and 25%;  and over 25%), while the manager's response  to the
second question  was  any  number between  0 and  100%  (of total  'unofficial  payments').  From
this information, it is possible to calculate  a range for the percent of revenues that each enterprise
reported paying to electricity and telecommunications  utilities.22 About 75 percent of enterprises
21  The question  refers  specifically  to power  and telecommunications,  but  does  not  separate between  the  two.  To
encourage  honest  responses  to  questions  about  bribery,  and  to  allow  enterprise  managers  to  avoid  implicating
themselves  when answering  questions  about frequency and level  of bribe  payments, the WBES  asked  about bribes
paid by 'firms  like yours' rather  than about the manager's  own  firm.  In the empirical  analysis, we  assume that the
manager was answering the question for a firm similar  to the  manager's  own enterprise  in terms of the independent
variables.
22  That  is,  the  share  to  the utilities  times  the  percentage  of revenue  as unofficial  payment.  Because  the second
response could take any value  between 0 and 100%, the ranges  are distinct for each enterprise.
13reported  paying  no  bribes  to  public  utilities  (see  Figure  2),  while  about  97.5  percent  of
enterprises reported an upper bound for bribes to utilities of less than 5.0 percent of revenues.23
It  is  assumed  that  the  percent  of  revenues  paid  as  bribes  to  telecommunications  and
electricity utilities by enterprise  i in countryj (Bij) is a function of enterprise  characteristics  (x,j),
characteristics  of  the  utilities  (uj),  country-level  characteristics  (zj)  and  an  unobserved
disturbance term (-j,).
Bij =a±  a  +  x  + fl2Uj +fi 3 Zj +  E,ij
As discussed above, lower and upper bounds for bribes as a percent of revenues,  b,,  bH
can  be  calculated  for  each  enterprise.  The  contribution  to  the  likelihood  function  for  each
enterprise  is,  therefore,  Pr(b,  < Bij <b,hH)24  Assuming  that  the  disturbance  term  is normally
distributed,  the  log-likelihood  function,  which  can  be  maximized  using  standard  maximum
likelihood estimation,  is:
L =  Xlog[4)(J  "  X-fiX0,  a  - 2 Uj  P3Zj  )  - a  - Oxii  - 2Uj - 43Zj
where 4) is the standard normal distribution.
23  Note that although  we know that an enterprise  that  reports an upRer  bound of less that  5  percent definitely  paid
less than five percent of revenues  as bribes  (ignoring reporting  errors),  it does not  follow that those enterprises  that
reported  an upper bound greater than 5 percent  of revenues  necessarily paid over  5 percent of revenues  in bribes to
utilities.  For example, an enterprise  that paid 2 percent of revenues in bribes could report lower and upper bounds of
1.2  and  6  percent  (i.e.,  the  actual  level  of bribes  is  between  the  two bounds).  Only  0.3  percent  of enterprises
reported lower bounds greater than  5.0 percent of revenues  (i.e.,  only 0.3 percent of enterprises reported  ranges that
were entirely  above  5.0 percent of revenues)  and no enterprises  reported  a lower bound greater than 8.0 percent of
revenues.
24 The estimation takes truncation below, at 0% of revenues, into account (i.e., negative bribes are not observed).
14The  measure  of corruption  used  in this  study  has  some  advantages  over  the  subjective
indices  used  in  previous  studies  of  the  determinants  of  corruption.25 One  problem  with
subjective  indices  is  the  question  of what benchmarks  respondents  use  for rating  the  extent of
corruption.  For example,  some respondents  might compare  corruption in a country to corruption
under a previous regime, others might compare it with neighboring countries, while others might
even  compare  it  with  their  own  personal  ideals.  If  different  respondents  use  different
benchmarks,  subjective  indices might suffer from  large noise-to-signal  ratios. 26 Moreover,  there
might  be  systematic  errors  due  to  cognitive  problems,  social  desirability  of  answers,  non-
attitudes,  wrong  attitudes,  and  soft attitudes  (Bertrand  and  Mullainathan,  2001;  Tanur,  1992;
Sudman et al.,  1996).  If these  systematic  errors  are correlated with enterprise  (or country level)
characteristics,  and  it is difficult  to obtain  instruments  that are  correlated  with the  explanatory
variables but not the  systematic  errors, results  using the indices  as  dependent variables  will  be
biased.  Consequently,  some  authors  have  suggested  that although  subjective  indices  might be
useful  as  explanatory  variables  (although  they  will  still  suffer  from  attenuation  bias and when
correlated with other explanatory  variables,  inconsistency),  they are less likely to be effective  as
dependent variables (Bertand and Mullainathan  2001).27
111.3  Econometric  Results
Enterprise Ownership for Enterprise Paying Bribe.  The base regression (see  Table  3)
includes  several  dummy variables to control for the ownership of the enterprise paying the bribe.
25 For instance,  a commonly used index, the Business International rating, is based on the assessment of "the degree
to which  business transactions  involve corruption  or questionable  payments"  on a  scale  from 0 to  10.  The remarks
of Glaeser  et al.  (2000)  about  another  perception  index  can  be  applied  here:  "While  these  survey questions  are
interesting,  they  are  also  vague,  abstract,  and  hard  to  interpret."  See  Treisman  (2000)  for  a  comprehensive
discussion of the existing cross-national corruption  indices.
26  Some  studies  have  found  evidence  consistent  with  this.  For  example,  the  account  of the  land  consolidation
program  in  villages  in  U.P.  in  Northern  India  described by  Oldenberg  (1987)  suggests  that,  there  may  often  be
discrepancies  between  personal  assessment  about  corruption  frequency  and  its  actual  incidence  (Bardhan  1997).
Measurement  error  might be  especially  problematic  in studies  that include  fixed  country  effects  (see  Bertand  and
Mullainathan,  2001).
27  The most comprehensive  study of the cross-national determinants of corruption is Treisman (2000), who is keenly
aware of  the limitation of such subjective measures.  He offers three justifications  for the use of these indices:  (1) the
Transparency  International  Ratings  are  highly  correlated  among  themselves,  (2)  they  are  also  highly  correlated
among themselves  across  years,  and (3)  in a footnote,  "a third reason, of course,  is that there are no  objective data
on the extent  of corruption."
15When margin (the measure of enterprise profitability)  is included in the base regression,  most of
the coefficients  on the dummy variables indicating ownership  are statistically insignificant.  This
suggests  that  enterprises  owned  by  foreigners,  'insiders'  (i.e.,  managers  and  workers)  and
privatized  enterprises owned by outsiders  pay similar levels of bribes to state-owned  enterprises
(the  default  category).  In  contrast,  the  coefficient  on  the dummy variables  indicating  that the
enterprise  is  a  de  novo  enterprise  (i.e.,  newly  established  private  enterprises)  is  statistically
significant  and  positive,  suggesting that de  novo enterprises  generally  pay  higher  bribes  than
privatized or state-owned enterprises.28  The effect appears  to be large in quantitative terms  - de
novo private enterprises  reported paying between  about 0.5 and 0.9 percent more of revenues  in
bribes than similar state-owned enterprises in the different model specifications.29
As  discussed  previously,  there  are  several  plausible  reasons  why  de novo  enterprises
might pay  higher  bribes  than  other  enterprises.  First,  many  studies  have  found  that  private
enterprises  in  general  and  de  novo  enterprises  in particular  perform  better  than  state-owned
enterprises  in the  transition  economies  (see Djankov and Murrell,  2000).  As noted previously,
both the  'speed money'  and 'endogenous  harassment'  hypotheses  suggest that more profitable
enterprises should pay higher bribes than less profitable enterprises.  Consequently,  to the extent
that  the  measure  of  profitability  (i.e.,  'margin')  does  not  fully  account  for  perfonnance
differences  between  state  and  privately  owned  enterprises,  the  ownership  dummies  might  be
partially  proxying  for  performance  differences.30 Consistent  with  the  idea  that  performance
differences  between  private  and  state-owned  enterprises  might partially  explain  the result,  the
coefficients  on  the  dummy  variables  indicating  de  novo  private  enterprises  and  privatized
enterprises  increase  in  magnitude  and  the  coefficient  on  privatized  enterprises  becomes
statistically  significant  when margin is excluded  (see  column  4 of Table  3).  Second,  as noted
28 This pattern  is consistent with the pattern observed for total bribes (i.e.,  bribes to all government officials not just
utilities) before controlling  for other factors that might affect corruption (see, European  Bank for Reconstruction  and
Development,  1999,  p 125-26).
29 Note that the  actual  average  reduction  would be smaller than  this since  most enterprises  did not  report paying
bribes and, therefore, bribes could not be reduced for these enterprises.
30  Although  foreign-owned  enterprises  also  appear  to  consistently  out-perform  state-owned  enterprises  in  the
transition  economies  (see Djankov  and Murrell,  2000),  the  small  number of these  enterprises  in the  sample  (see
Table 2) might make it difficult for the coefficient on this dummy variable to achieve statistical significance.
16earlier,  if managers of de novo enterprises  have less well developed relationships with either the
utility  employees  demanding  bribes,  utility  employees  might  demand  higher  bribes  to
compensate  them  for  the  additional  risk  of  taking  bribes  for  performing  favors  for  the
entrepreneur  (for example,  for  'misreading'  meters).  Finally,  managers of de novo enterprises
might,  in general, have  less political  influence with government  officials  (e.g.,  judges or police
officials)  meaning that they are less likely to be able to appeal to them when threatened by utility
employees (e.g., to avoid  'sudden' breakdowns  in service).
Enterprise Profitability.  Enterprises  that  were  more  profitable  reported  paying  higher
bribes than less profitable  enterprises.  This is consistent with either the endogenous  harassment
or 'speed money'  theory of corruption (see  Hypothesis 4).  A one-standard-deviation  increase  in
margin raises reported bribes to utilities by about 0.2 percent of revenues.
Overdue Payments to Utilities.  Since  the  coefficient  on  the  index  variable  indicating
overdue  payments  to utilities  is negative  and  statistically  significant  (and higher  values  of the
index  mean  lower  overdue  payments),  this  implies  that enterprises  with  overdue  payments  to
utilities  generally  reported  paying  higher  bribes  to  utilities  than  enterprises  without  overdue
payments  (see  Table  3).  In  contrast,  the  coefficients  on overdue  payments  to  suppliers  and
workers  are  either  statistically  insignificant  or  have  a  positive  coefficient.  The  (sometimes
statistically significant) positive  coefficient on overdue payments to workers might be consistent
with the previous  results regarding profitability - if enterprises  with overdue payments are more
financially troubled than other enterprises,  they  might on average have  lower ability/willingness
to pay bribes.  Although this will also be true for enterprises  with overdue payments to utilities,
other  factors work  in the opposite  direction.  In particular,  enterprises  with overdue payments
might be  willing to pay bribes (of less than  the amount of the  overdue payment) to avoid being
disconnected  from utility service.  The coefficient  on overdue payments to utilities  suggests that
enterprises  with substantial  (manageable/modest)  overdue  payments  reported paying about  0.15
percent  more  of revenues  to  utilities  in  bribes  than  enterprises  with  manageable  (modest/no)
17overdue  payments.31  These  findings  are  consistent  with  hypothesis  5 that bribe  extraction  is
higher when the firm is vulnerable to threats by the utility employees.
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Figure  3:  Coefficients  on  enterprises  size  dumrnies  in  than  large  enterprises  (see  Figure  3).
regressions  on bribes  paid to utilities  as  percent of revenues
(relative to enterprises with over 500 employees).  Enterprises  with  fewer  than  50
Data Source:  The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 02000 The  enterprises  paid  about  1.5  percentage
World Bank Group.
Note:  Graph shows coefficients on size dummies from regression shown in  points  as bribes  to  utilities
column  I of Table  I.  Omitted category is enterprises with more than 500  po  of revenues
employees.  Consequently,  coefficients can be interpreted as the additional
percent of revenues paid by enterprises of that size over a similar enterprise  than  enterprises  with  more  than  500
with more than  500 employees,  I  employees,  while  enterprises  with
between 50 and 500 employees  paid about  1.0 percent of revenues more in bribes (see Figure 3).
The  differences  between  the  amounts  paid  by  enterprises  of different  sizes  are  statistically
significant.32
Ownership  of Utilities.  Consistent  with hypothesis  2, enterprises  paid lower bribes to
utilities  in countries  where  the  fixed line telecommunications  and  electricity  distribution  were
privately  owned  (see  Table  3).  In  the  regression  that  excludes  the  measure  of enterprise
profitability  (i.e., margin), the coefficients  on both dummy variables  are  statistically significant.
31The index variable  is coded  as I for substantial,  2 for manageable,  3 for modest and 4 for none.
32 The null hypothesis that enterprises  of all sizes pay similar  share of revenues  in bribes can be rejected at less than
a 1 percent significance  level (X2  (5)  = 30.37, Prob.> X 2 is 0.00).
18When  margin is included,  sample size is dramatically  reduced and the coefficient  on the dummy
variable  indicating  that  electricity  distribution  has  been  privatized  become  statistically
insignificant  at  conventional  significance  levels.  Although  this  might  suggest  that  electricity
privatization  is  less  important  than  telecommunications  privatization  in  this  respect,  it  is
important  to interpret  the  result carefully.  As  noted previously,  the local  nature  of electricity
distribution  might mean that electricity privatization  is measured poorly.  Excluding  the dummy
variable  indicating privatization of electricity  distribution  does not affect any of the other results
(see column 2 of Table 3).
To  the  extent  that  the  variables  proxying  for  the  effect  of competition  and  capacity
constraints  on  corruption  control  for  these  factors,  the  variables  indicating  utility  ownership
should  proxy  for  the  direct  effect  of ownership.  By  creating  clear residual  claimants  for  the
utility's  profits,  private  ownership  might  increase  pressure  on  enterprise  managers  to  reduce
corruption.  The  point  estimates  of the  coefficient  on  the  dummy  variable  indicating  that  the
fixed line telecommunications  operator is privately owned suggests that utility privatization  has a
large  impact  on  corruption  in the  sector,  with privatization  reducing  the  percent  of enterprise
revenues paid in bribes by about 0.6 percentage points.
Capacity and Competition.  Consistent  with hypothesis  1, enterprises  in  countries  with
better-developed  telecommunications  systems  appear  to  pay  lower  bribes  than  enterprises  in
countries  with less developed  systems.  The coefficient  on fixed  lines per capita is negative  and
statistically  significant  throughout  most  of the  analysis.  Since  the  analysis  includes  several
macroeconomic  controls, including per capita income,  one plausible  explanation for this result is
that excess  demand  for the utility's services is lower in countries  with better-developed  systems.
Increasing  the number of fixed lines by about one  standard deviation for the transition  economies
in the  samples  (see Table  1) would decrease  the  share  of revenues  paid as bribes  to utilities  by
about 0.4 percentage points.33
Consistent with hypothesis  3,  competition  also appears to lower bribes  paid to utilities -
the  coefficient  on  the  variable  indicating  the  number  of  cellular  companies  is  statistically
33  This was close to the difference  between Ukraine (19.1)  and Slovakia (28.6) in 1998.
19significant  and  negative.  The  point  estimate  of the  parameter  suggests  that  increasing  the
number of cellular companies by one reduces  the share of revenues  paid as bribes to utilities by
about 0.2 percentage points.
Macroeconomic  and Political Controls.  Since the overall level of corruption  in a given
country  might  affect  the  level  of  bribes  paid  to  utilities,  the  analysis  also  includes  some
macroeconomic  and  political  variables  that  might  affect  corruption  in  other  areas.  To  avoid
problems  associated with reverse causation,  the macroeconomic  and political controls are lagged
at least one year.34 Given the relatively modest number of countries in this analysis, it is possible
to  include  only  a  small  number  of the  many variables  suggested  in  the literature  in the  base
regression.  However,  many  additional  macroeconomic  and political  variables - most of which
have statistically  insignificant  effects  on bribes paid to utilities in this  sample - are included  in
the sensitivity analysis  (see Table 4 and Table  5).
The  coefficients  on the  macroeconomic  and political  control  variables  included  in the
base  regression  are  generally  statistically  significant  with  signs  consistent  with  theory  and
previous  analyses.  Corruption appears  lower in countries  with higher levels of democracy;  that
are  more  open to  imports;  where  exports  of natural  resources  are  less  important  and  where
growth is  faster.  After  controlling for these variables,  the coefficient  on per capita  GDP is not
statistically significant at conventional  levels.
The main results  in this study  are also  robust to several  different  assumptions regarding
the control variables.  One concern is that some of the control variables  might be endogenous.  In
particular,  Ades  and  Di  Tella  (1999,  p.  988)  suggest  that  if bureaucrats  determine  market
structure,  the level of corruption  in any given country might affect the share of imports  in GDP.
Similarly,  others  have  suggested  that  corruption  might  also  affect  growth  (see,  for  example,
Mauro,  1995).  In practice,  however, the main results from this  study are robust to the exclusion
34  Macroeconomic  data are for  1998.  Data  from Beck et al. (2001)  are  for  1997,  which was the most recent year
available at the time of writing.  The regulation  and corporate tax indices used in the sensitivity analysis  are also for
1997, since data for 1998 were also not available.
20of either of these variables.35 Finally, although most of the control variables  are available for the
all the countries  in the sample,  exports  of minerals,  metals and fuel  was not available  for either
Ukraine  or Uzbekistan.  However,  the  main results  are  robust to  replacing this  variable with  a
dummy variable  indicating that the country is an oil exporter (see column 5 of Table 3), which is
available  for the entire  sample.  Since mineral,  fuel and metals made up a considerably  greater
share  of exports  for  oil  exporters  than  for  non-exporters,  this  dummy  variable  seems  to be  a
reasonable  measure  of the  importance of natural  resources  in a country's  exports.36 Consistent
with the previous  results, the coefficient  on the dummy  is positive  and  statistically significant,
providing more evidence  that corruption  is higher in  countries  where  economic  rents are  more
important.
Sensitivity  Analysis.  Over the past decade,  many  studies have  looked at country level
variables that might affect the overall  level of corruption.  Although most of these determinants
would  not be  expected  to  affect  corruption  in  the  utility  sector per se,  to the  extent  that they
affect  the overall  level  of the  corruption  in the  country,  they might have  an indirect  effect  on
corruption  in the utility sector.  Given the relatively  modest number  of countries  in the sample
(see  footnote  19) and the large literature on the potential determinants  of corruption,  it would be
impossible  to  simultaneously  include  all  possible  regressors  in  a  single  regression,  especially
since  many are unavailable  for some countries  in the  sample.  However,  to check robustness, we
add  many  variables  suggested  in  the  literature  - including  regional  dummies,  measures  of
regulation  and  taxation,  alternative  measures  of the  political  and  institutional  environment,
factors  that  might  affect  natural  openness,  and  measures  of  government  spending  and
decentralization  - to  the  base  regression  (i.e.,  column  2  of Table  3).37  In  addition,  we  also
include  a subjective  measure  of corruption  in the  regression  as an additional  robustness  check.
35  The coefficients on the main variables of interest  (i.e.,  the variables  listed  in Table 4) remain similar  in terms of
size and statistical significance when either variable  is excluded.
36  For  the  countries  in  this  sample  63  percent  of exports  were  mineral,  fuel  or metals  for  oil exporters  in  1998
compared to  10 percent for non-exporters  (authors'  calculations).  The difference  in means  is statistically significant
at higher than a  I percent  level.
21Although this  variable  is potentially  endogenous  (i.e.,  corruption  in the utility sector might be
reflected  in the  measure  of corruption),  it does not  appear to have  a significant  impact on  the
main results.
For the most part, the coefficients  on the additional variables are statistically  insignificant
and they have  little  impact on the main results (see  Table 4 and Table  5).  The coefficients  on
margin,  the de novo dummy,  and the number of cellular companies  remain  significant  at a five
percent  level or lower,  while the coefficients  on the dummy indicating privatization  of the fixed
line  telecommunications  operator  and the index of overdue payments remain significant  at a 10
percent level.  The coefficient  on the number of fixed  lines remains  negative  in all regressions
but becomes  statistically  insignificant  at  conventional  levels  in  one  of the  thirteen  additional
regressions.
Although the small sample of countries  and the measure of bribes to a single sector (i.e.,
utilities)  mean  that  this  sample  is  not  necessarily  well  suited  to  looking  at  the  impact  of
macroeconomic  or political factors on overall  corruption,  the two statistically significant  results
are  of interest.  First,  in contrast to  the results  in Lederman  et al. (2001),  we do not  find  any
evidence  that corruption  is lower  in countries  with parliamentary  systems.  Second,  it appears
that corruption is generally lower in countries  that have privatized more  (i.e., with higher scores
on the EBRD's  index  of privatization).  Although  this  might  seem inconsistent  with previous
results  that  suggest  that  privatized  enterprises  pay  similar  levels  of bribes  to  state-owned
enterprises  (i.e.,  the  coefficient  on the  dummy variables  indicating  privatized  enterprises  was
statistically insignificant  once the measure  of profitability  is included in the analysis - see Table
3), this is not necessarily the case.  Although privatization might not affect the bribes paid by the
privatized  enterprise  itself,  if privatization  increases  competition  for  all  enterprises  in  the
economy  (i.e.,  including enterprises that remain  state-owned),  it might be correlated  with lower
levels  of bribes  for  all  enterprises  facing  this  increased  competition.  That  is,  by increasing
competition  and decreasing  rents for all enterprises  throughout the economy,  privatization might
37  Some variables  suggested  in  the literature  are  omitted from the sensitivity  analysis  because  there is insufficient
variation  (e.g., none of the countries  in the  sample were  former British colonies),  while others are omitted because
there  is  insufficient  data  available  for  the  countries  in  the  sample  (e.g.,  measures  of  ethno-linguistic
22lower  bribes  for both  privatized  and  state-owned  enterprises.  This  interpretation  is  consistent
with  results  from previous  studies  (see,  e.g.,  Ades  and  Di  Tella,  2000)  and the results  in this
paper that suggest that openness  to imports, which might also increase competition,  is correlated
with lower levels of corruption.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Rather than  discussing  the political,  macroeconomic  and cultural  factors that  affect the
overall level of corruption  (see, e.g.,  Ades and Di Tella,  1999;  Treisman,  2000; Lederman et al.,
2001),  this paper primarily focuses  on how characteristics  of firms paying and receiving bribes
affect the  equilibrium  level  of bribes  in the utility sector.  Our  conceptual  framework  suggests
that characteristics  of bribe takers  (i.e.,  the rents  available  for extraction  in the utility sector, the
extent  of competition  in the  sector  and  the penalty  functions  faced by utility  employees)  and
bribe  payers  (i.e.,  the  firm's  willingness  to pay bribes, the  leverage that bribe takers  have over
the  bribe  payers,  and  the  length  of the  payers  relationship  with  the  takers)  should  both  be
important.  Further, the multiple-equlibria  nature of corruption  means that bribe payments  in the
utility sector should be higher in countries where the overall level of corruption is higher.
The  empirical  evidence  from  a  survey  of around  2000  enterprises  in  21  countries  in
Eastern Europe  and Central Asia is remarkably consistent  with the  conceptual  framework.  We
find strong evidence  that bribes  paid to utilities  are lower in countries  with greater capacity  and
competition  in the utility  sector and where the  utility has been privatized.  On the side of bribe
payers,  enterprises  that  are  more  profitable,  enterprises  that  have  greater overdue  payments  to
utilities  and  de novo private  firms  appear  to pay  higher bribes.  Macroeconomic  and political
factors  that contribute to higher corruption at the national  level  also appear to increase bribes in
the utility sector.
The  results  from  this  study  suggest  that countries  can reduce  corruption  in the  utility
sector through  utility privatization and increased  competition  in the utility sector.  In addition  to
reducing  corruption  by  easing  capacity  constraints,  privatization  might  improve  internal
incentives  to reduce  corruption while  competition might reduces  the utilities'  ability to demand
fractionalization).
23bribes from enterprises  using their services.  Steps to reduce corruption in the utility sector might
also have beneficial  side  effects on the overall level  of corruption,  due to the multiple equilibria
nature of corruption.
It is less clear how to interpret the finding that more profitable firms pay higher bribes.  If
the "speed money"  theory  is correct (i.e.,  bribes  are acting  as price mechanism),  then a modest
level  of corruption  might  actually  improve  efficiency  (over no corruption)  so long as  capacity
constraints  remain in the utility sector.  This is because under this hypothesis bribes ensure that
utility connections  are  allocated  to the enterprises  that value them  most highly,  resulting  in an
efficient  allocation of resources.  However,  if the  "endogenous  harassment"  theory  is  correct,
rent seeking and stealing mutes  the firms'  incentives to take costly actions to improve efficiency
and  increases  incentives  to hide profits.  Consequently,  corruption  will have  an adverse  impact
on efficiency.  While our data do not allow us to distinguish between these two scenarios,  future
empirical work to do so is clearly desirable.
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28TABLE  1:  SUMMARY  STATISTICS  AND  SOURCES  FOR  MACROECONOMIC  AND  POLITICAL
VARIABLES.
Variable  Description  Source  Mean  Std.  Dev.
Number of Cellular Companies  Number  Authors'  Calculations  2.815  1.543 (see text).
Electricity Distribution Privatized  Dummy  Bacon (1999)  0.424  0.494
Country has Parliamentary System  Dummy  Beck et al. (2001)  0.246  0.431
Years that country has scored six or higher on
Years o f Democracy  legislative  and executive index of electoral  Beck et al. (2001)  3.779  2.751 Years  of Democracy  ~~~competitiveness  (IEC)  since start of transition.  Bc  ta.(01  .7  .5
See below.
Index (0-7).  Avg.  score on legislative  and
Democracy Index  executive  index of electoral competitiveness  Beck et al. (2001)  6.760  0.539 (fIEC).  High numbers mean greater  level of
democracy
EBRD Index for large-scale  Index (1-4) --  Higher scores  mean greater  EBRD  (1999)  3.041  0.676
privatization  extent of privatization
Political Rights  Index (1-7) --  Higher scores  mean greater  Freedom  House (2000)  3.184  1.804 democracy
Decentralization  Local and State Spending as share of total  Intemational Monetary  0.326  0.115 govemment spending  Fund (2001)
Regulation Index  Index (1-5).  Higher scores mean regulation  is  Heritage Foundation  3.379  0.780 more restrictive  (1997)
Corporate Tax Index  Index (1 -5).  Higher scores  mean corporate tax  Heritage Foundation  3.079  0.651 rates  are higher  (1997)
Index (1-6).  Intemational  Country Risk Guide
Corruption (Overall)  Index of Corruption.  Higher scores mean less  PRS Group (1999)  3.200  1.097
corruption.
Intemational
Number of Fixed Lines  Per 100 inhabitants  Telecommunications  20.987  9.930
Union (2000)
Fuel, Mineral  and Metal  Exports  As %  of GDP  World Bank (2001)  24.075  22.494
Population  Natural  Log  World Bank (2001)  16.414  1.384
Inflation  Average between  1996 and  1999  World Bank (2001)  36.939  67.545
Openness  Imports as percent of GDP  World Bank (2001)  46.675  17.913
Government  Expenditures  As %  of GDP  World Bank (2001)  16.900  5.115
GDP  Growth.  Average between  1996 and  1999  World Bank (2001)  1.978  4.244
Per Capita GDP  000s of US $  World Bank (2001)  5.906  3.175
Fixed Line Telecommunications  World Bank
Dummy  Telecommunications  0.502  0.500 Operator Privatized  Department
World Bank Global
Country is Landlocked  Dummy  DevelopmentNetwork  0.388  0.487
____  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  _____  ____  _____Growth  D atabase
Note: Data is for  1998,  except where  noted and for data from Beck et al (2001)  and Heritage Foundation (1997),  which are from  1997  since data
for 1998  were not available.
29Table 2:  Means, Variances and Descriptions of Enterprise Level Variables.
Variable  Description  Mean  Ski.  Dev.
Extent of Overdue Payments to Workers  Index (1-4).  Higher values mean less overdue  3.429  0.941 payments.
Extent of Overdue Payments to Utilities  Index (1-4).  Higher values  mean less overdue  3.429  0.928 payments.
Extent of Overdue  Payments  to  Suppliers  Index (1  -4).  Higher values mean less overdue  3.132  1.056 payments.
Margin  OUnit Sales Price less Operating  Costs (as percent of  16.508  15.643
operating costs)
Ownership (omitted Category is state-owned)
Largest Shareholder - Other Private - Privatized  Dummy.  Other  Private  implies that it is not owned by  0.183  0.387 frign enterprises  or individuals  or by insiders
Largest Shareholder - Insiders  Dummy.  Insiders are workers and managers  0.153  0.360
Largest Shareholder - Foreign  Dummy.  0.034  0.182
Largest Shareholder-  Other Private - De Novo  Dummy.  Other  Private implies that it is not owned by  0.488  0.500 foreign enterprises or individuals or by insiders
Size (omitted category is over 500 employees)
Fewer than 9 employees  Dummy  0.265  0.441
Between  10 and 49 employees  Dummy  0.200  0.400
Between 50 and 99 employees  Dummy  0.160  0.367
Between  100 and  199 employees  Dummy  0.137  0.344
Between 200 and 499 employees  Dummy  0.154  0.361
Ownership (omitted category is 'other services')
Sector -- Transportation  Dummy  0.061  0.240
Sector -Wholesale and Retail  Trade  Dummy  0.269  0.443
Sector-- Manufacturing  Dummy  0.297  0.457
Sector -- Mining and Construction  Dummy  0.099  0.298
Sector-- Farming, fishing, forestry  Dummy  0.135  0.342
egion
Region -- South East Europe  Dummy  0.164  0.371
Region  -- Cormmonwealth  of Independent States  Dummy  0.535  0.499
Region -- Central Europe and the Baltic States  Dummy  0.301  0.459
Data Source: The World Business Environment  Survey (WBES) 02000 The World Bank Group
30Table  3: Impact of enterprise  and country characteristics  on bribes to utilities.
Estimation  Method  Interval Regression
Dependent Variable  Percent of Revenues  Paid to Utilities in Bribers
Base  ~~Margin  Oil Exporting
Base  Omitted  Dummy
Number of Observations  1822  1822  2327  2200
Sector Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Size  of Enterprise Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Utility Privatization
Fixed Line Telecom Operator  Privatized  -0.6610***  -0.6698***  -0.5741***  -0.7136***
(Dummy)  (-4.00)  (-4.07)  (-3.81)  (-4.87)
Electricity Distribution  Privatized  -0.2947  -0.5609***  -0.1222
(Dummy)  (-1.49)  (-3.15)  (-0.93)
Capacity and Competition
Fixed Lines  -0.0424***  -0.0364***  -0.0531***  -0.0348***
(Per 1000 people)  (-3.60)  (-3.30)  (-4.85)  (-3.20)
Cellular Companies  -0.2182***  -0.2278***  -0.1769** *  -0.0970**
(Number)  (-3.16)  (-3.32)  (-2.76)  (-2.09)
nterprise  Profitability
Margin  0.0127***  0.0126***  0.0113***
(Unit Sales Price less Operating Costs as %  of operating costs)  (3.73)  (3.70)  (3.81)
Enterprise  Ownership
Largest  Shareholder - Other Private - De Novo  0.6768***  0.6529***  0.7915***  0.4942**
(Dummy)  (2.92)  (2.84)  (3.72)  (2.59)
Largest  Shareholder-  Other Private - Privatized  0.3139  0.2882  0.4236**  0.2573
(Dummy)  (1.38)  (1.28)  (2.03)  (1.35)
Largest  Shareholder - Foreign  0.2370  0.2519  0.3818  0.0131
(Dummy)  (0.62)  (0.66)  (1.11)  (0.04)
Largest Shareholder - Insiders (Managers or Employees)  0.3444  0.3249  0.3632  0.1312
(Dumnmy)  (1.42)  (1.35)  (1.61)  (0.66)
Overdue  Payments to Utilities and Others
Overdue Payments to Utilities  -0.1491  -0.1641 **  -0.1345*  -0.1317*
(Index - higher values mean less overdue payments)  (-1.87)  (-2.08)  (-1.85)  (-1.96)
Overdue Payments to Workers  0.1092  0.1214  0.0535  0.1237*
(Index - higher values mean  less overdue payments)  (1.32)  (1.48)  (0.71)  (1.81)
Overdue Payments to Suppliers  -0.0556  -0.0614  -0.0526  -0.0492
(Index - higher values mean less overdue payments)  (-0.83)  (-0.92)  (-0.85)  (-0.85)
Country Controls
Per Capita GDP in  1998  0.0067  -0.0086  0.0366  -0.0330
(000s of US  dollars)  (0.18)  (-0.24)  (1.06)  (-0.89)
Political  Rights  -0.2873***  -0.2767***  -0.2307***  -0.2010***
(Index - Higher values mean  greater democracy)  (-4.25)  (-4.14)  (-3.84)  (-3.44)
GDP growth  -0.0584***  -0.0599***  -0.0690***  -0.0615***
(Average between  1996 and  1998)  (-3.47)  (-3.58)  (-4.49)  (-4.00)
Openness  -0.0157**  -0.0106**  -0.0185***  -0.0099**
(Imports as  share of GDP)  (-2.58)  (-2.14)  (-3.23)  (-2.27)
Fuel, Mineral and Metal  Exports  0.0186***  0.0181 ***  0.0138***
(As share oftotal exports)  (3.81)  (3.72)  (3.11)
Oil Exporter  0.5848***
(Dummy)  (2.76)
Log-Likelihood  -1736.8  -1737.9  -2084.2  -2261.6
Data Source: The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 0)2000 The World Bank Group.
T-statistics are  in parentheses.  * Significant at  10% level.  **  Significant  at 5%  level.  ***  Significant at 10 percent  level.
a  Regressions  include  6  dummies  for  enterprise  size  based upon  employment.  The categories  are:  enterprises  with fewer  than  10  (full-time)
employees; between  10 and 49 employees;  between 50 and 99 employees; between  100 and  199 employees; between  200 and 499 employees and
over 500 employees.  b Regressions  include  seven  dummies  based  upon  sector of operations.  The  categories  are: manufacturing;  agriculture;
other industry; retail and wholesale trade;  transportation; other services; and other.
31Table 4: Coefficients on Main Variables  when additional independent variables are included in regression (see Table 3, Column  2 for base regression)..
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS PERCENT OF REVENUES PAID TO UTILITIES IN BRIBES
Additional Independent Variable  None  Region  Dummiee  Regulation Index  Corporate Tax  Democracy  Index  Years Since  Parliamentary
_____________  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~-  Rate Index  Democracy  Dummy
Number of Observations  1822  1822  1636  1636  1822  1822  1822
Coefficient on Additional  Independent Variable  - - -0.0063  0.0302  0.1610  0.0061  O.5008**
- _  (-0.05)  (0.28)  (0.94)  (0.16)  2.07
Coefficients on other variables of Interest
Fixed Line Telecom Operator Privatized  -0.6698***  -0.5192***  -0.6262***  -0.6233***  -0.6217***  -0.6605***  -0.5534***
(Dummy)  (4.07)  (-2.72)  (-3.57)  (-3.56)  (-3.62)  (-3.78)  (-3.49)
Fixed Lines  -0.0364***  -0.0488***  -0.0426* *  -0.0426***  -0.0374***  0.0366***  -0.0148
(Per  1000 people)  (-3.30)  (-3.95)  (-3.33)  (-3.76)  (-3.38)  (-3.30)  (-0.98)
Cellular Companies  -0.2278***  -0.1922**  -0.1886**  -0.1907**  -0.2657***  -0.2272***  -0.1746**
(Number)  (-3.32)  (-2.58)  (-2.19)  (-2.21)  (-3.33)  (-3.30)  (-2.39)
Margin  0.0126**$  0.0125***  0.0113***  0.0113***  0.0125***  0.0126***  0.0128***
(Sales Price less Operating Costs as %  of operating costs)  (3.70)  (3.68)  (3.17)  (3.18)  (3.66)  (3.70)  (3.75)
Largest Shareholder - Other Private -- De Novo  0.6529***  0.6739***  0.5405**  0.5428**  0.6480***  0.6524***  0.6644***
(Dummy)  (2.84)  (2.91)  (2.21)  (2.23)  (2.81)  (2.83)  (2.88)
Overdue Payments to Utilities  -0.1641**  -0.1420*  -0.1696**  -0.1696**  -0.1555*  -0.1639**  -0.1565**
(Index - higher values mean less overdue payments)  (-2.08)  (-1.78)  (-2.03)  (-2.03)  (-1.96)  (-2.08)  (-1.98)
Data Source:  The World Business Enviromnent Survey (WBES) 02000 The World Bank Group.
T-statistics are in parentheses.  * Significant at 10% level.  **  Significant at 5% level.  Significant at 10 percent level.
Note:  Regressions include  all variables  included in Column 2 of Table 3 including  sector and size dummies.  '  Regional dummies are  dummnies for Central Europe, Southeastem  Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent  States.
32Table  5: Coefficients  on Main Variables  when additional  independent variables  are included  in regression (see Table 3,  Column 2 for base regression).
-DEPENDENT  VARIABLE IS BRIBES PAID TO UTILITIES  AS PERCENT OF REVENUE
Additioal  Indeendent  ariablePrivatization  Landlocked  Population  AeaeIftin  Government  beetaiain  Overall Addition al In dep  en dent Variable  Index  Dummy  (natural Log)  Average  Inflation  Expenditures  Decentralization  Corruption
Number of Observations  1822  1822  1822  1822  1822  1655  1737
Coefficient on Additional Independent Variable  0.4436***  -0.2051  0.0694  -0.0014  -0.0037  0.4047  -0.0556
(-3.29)  (-0.98)  (0.58)  (-1.25)  (-0.18)  (0.37)  (-0.66)
Coefficients on other variables  of Interest
Fixed Line Telecom Operator Privatized  -0.4418*"  -0.5977***  -0.6948***  0.7413"'*  -0.6794***  -0.4498*  -0.6799"'*
(Dummy)  (-2.47)  (-3.34)  (-4.06)  (-4.24)  (-3.92)  (-1.71)  (-4.16)
Fixed Lines  -0.0312***  -0.0389***  -0.0358**  -0.0244*  -0.0361**"  -0.0301**  -0.0427"**
(Per 1000 people)  (-2.78)  (-3.43)  (-3.23)  (-1  69)  (-3.23)  (-2.02)  (-3.81)
Cellular Companies  -0.1617**  -0.2546***  -0.2744***  -0.2712"**  -0.2192"'*  -0.2006"*  -0.1533"*
(Number)  (-2.27)  (-3.44)  (-2.59)  (-3.50)  (-2.61)  (-2.39)  (-1.98)
Margin  0.0127**"  0.0125**"  0.0126"**  0.0123***  0.0126"**  0.0129"**  0.0119***
(Sales Price less Operating  Costs as %  of operating costs)  (3.73)  (3.68)  (3.70)  (3.61)  (3.71)  (3.45)  (3.47)
Largest Shareholder - Other Private- De Novo  0.6495**"  0.6465***  0.6538***  0.6546"*'  0.6520**"  0.8611 ***  0.6103"*'
(Dummy)  (2.81)  (2.81)  (2.84)  (2.85)  (2.83)  (3.17)  (2.63)
Overdue Payments to Utilities  -0.1594**  -0.1601  "  -0.1666**  -0.1652**  -0.1642**  -0.1669'  -0.1747*"
(Index - higher values mean less overdue  payments)  (-2.02)  (-2.03)  (-2.11)  (-2.10)  (-2.09)  (-1.91)  (-2.17)
Data Source:  The World Business  Environmnent Survey (WBES)  02000 The World  Bank Group.
T-statistics are in parentheses.  * Significant at 10% level.  "*  Significant at 5%  level.  "'  Significant at  10 percent level.
Note:  Regressions  include all variables  included in Column 2 of Table 3 including sector and size dummies.
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